This paper deals with the complexity of cooperative solution concepts, notably, the bargaining set and the kernel, for coalitional games in compact form. In [4], Deng and Papadimitriou have left open a number of issues regarding those concepts which this paper provides a thorough answer to. Open issues (and correspondent answers we provide) are as follows. Given a graph game G and an imputation x: (a) it was conjectured that checking for x to belong to the bargaining set BS G of G is Π P 2 -complete-the conjecture will be shown to hold; (b) it was conjectured that checking for x to belong to the kernel K G of G is NP-hard-the conjecture will be shown to hold, in particular, by proving the tighter bound that it is in fact ∆ P 2 -complete; (c) it was asked for the complexity of checking x to belong to either BS G or K G (membership, as the hardness are immediately implied by (a) and (b) above) for games G in general compact form, where the game is given implicitly by an algorithm for computing v(S) 1 -we formally define such general compact games and prove that those complexities are in Π P 2 and ∆ P 2 , resp., provided that the worth-computing algorithm runs in non-deterministic polynomial time.
Introduction
Coalitional games model situations where groups of players can cooperate in order to obtain certain worths, and have been extensively used to study applicative scenarios in economics and social sciences [1] . Also, coalitional games are interesting in distributed AI, multi-agent systems, electronic commerce and Internet related issues [6, 2, 15] .
Such games come in two guises [13] : Games with transferable utility (or TU Games), the one which are of interest here, where there is no constraints whatsoever over the way coalitional worths can be distributed among coalition members, and Coalitional Games with non-transferable utility (or NTU Games), where a coalition guarantees a specific set of consequences that assign to its players specific sets of possible payoffs.
One main problem to be faced in formalizing such cooperative settings is establishing an appropriate concept of stability implied by payoff distributions among the members of a coalition [13] . To illustrate a nonempty set S ⊆ N of players is called a coalition, with N , the one including all players, being called the grand coalition. A TU game assigns a worth v(S) to any coalition S (also called the value of S), which needs to be distributed among its members. A feasible solution for a coalitional game is an allowed way to assign payoffs to all players, and the stable ones are to be 1 v(S) denoting the worth (or value) of the coalition S looked for. Indeed, such a distribution of the total worth v(N ), should be acceptable to all players, for otherwise they may try to form different coalitions, in order to claim higher worths. Several such stable distribution modes, most often called solution concepts, have been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., [18] ), most notable examples being the stable sets, the core, the bargaining set, the kernel, the nucleolus and the Shapley value. In particular, while stable sets are not guaranteed to exist and the core may be empty (see e.g. [8] for a recent result on the complexity of deciding its emptiness), the other cited solution concepts always exist. Moreover, while the Shapley value and the nucleolus are single values, the bargaining set and the kernel generally include more than one stable imputation [13] .
In this paper, we focus on the computational properties of the bargaining set and the kernel and we deal with a setting where games are represented in compact form. Indeed, to explicitly represent the associations of coalitions with their worths is often unfeasible, since listing all those associations would require exponential space in the number of players. This is practically relevant in several application cases as, for instance, with typical Internet-based ones. This is the reason why several compact representation schemes have been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., [4, 6, 3] ).
In a paper dated 1994, Deng and Papadimitriou have discussed the complexity of coalitional solution concepts [4] and proved several results about a natural and simple form of compact TU games, called graph games. But in this same paper several interesting issues were explicitly left open. Among them, the following are dealt with here:
(a) deciding whether an imputation is in the bargaining set of a graph game was conjectured to be Π P 2 -complete; (b) deciding whether an imputation is in the kernel of a graph game was conjectured to be NP-hard;
(c) it was asked for complexity results to be provided for a generalized compact representation scheme in which coalition worths are given implicitly by an algorithm for computing them.
In what follows, we shall prove that conjectures (a) and (b) above hold and, moreover, we shall provide a rather general answer to question (c), by showing the following results:
• for any compact game representation for which worths of coalitions are computable in non-deterministic polynomial time (FNP), deciding whether an imputation is in the bargaining set is in Π P 2 , and is Π P 2 -hard for graph games, for which it is thus Π P 2 -complete; • for any compact game representation for which worths of coalitions are computable in non-deterministic polynomial time (FNP), deciding whether an imputation is in the kernel is in ∆ P 2 , and is ∆ P 2 -hard for graph games, for which it is thus ∆ P 2 -complete. As for question (c), we notice that the constraint for the worth computation machinery to lie in FNP is reasonably weak, in order to model all possible "compact" game representations where the worths of coalitions may be computed "efficiently." Also, it is worthwhile noting that it appears generally sensible to analyze the computational complexity of tasks associated with solution concepts (and the bargaining set and the kernel are two quite relevant ones indeed [13] ), as this corresponds to analyzing the feasibility of using such concepts under the thesis of bounded rationality, that is, that decisions taken by realistic agents cannot involve unbounded resources to support reasoning [4, 19] , where computational complexity has been suggested as a suitable mathematical tool to formally capture bounded rationality [4, 7] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents definitions and preliminary notions. Section 3 is devoted to analyze the bargaining set, while Section 4 focuses on the kernel. Finally, in Section 5, conclusions and some further results are briefly discussed.
Preliminaries

Coalitional Games
Definition 1. A Coalitional Game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair N, v where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players and v : 2 N → R maps coalitions S to their real-valued worths.
By x(S) we denote the value i∈S x i , where x is a vector of values and S ⊆ N is a coalition. Definition 2. A vector (x i ) i∈S of real numbers is an S-feasible payoff vector if x(S) = v(S). We refer to an N -feasible payoff vector as a feasible payoff profile. An imputation of a TU game G is a feasible payoff profile x for which x i ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . Definition 3. Let G be a TU game, and let x be an imputation. The excess of the generic coalition S at x, denoted by e(S, x), is defined as v(S) − x(S).
Hereafter, let us denote by I i,j the set of all coalitions that contain player i but not player j. An outcome for a coalitional game specifies payoffs for all players. A solution concept is a way to select "stable" outcomes for a coalitional game: the bargaining set and the kernel, which this paper focuses on, are two of them. Both solution concepts are characterized by defining suitable notions of objection and counterobjection, that are recalled later in this paper.
Compact Representations
We now discuss compact representation schemes, beginning with graph games [4] . In graph games players are encoded as vertices in an edge-weighted graph G = (N, E, W ), and the worth of a coalition S is computed as the sum of the weights of the edges connecting players in S. That is, if we denote by edges(S) the set {{p, q} ∈ E | {p, q} ⊆ S}, the worth of the coalition S is v(S) = e∈edges(S) W (e). For instance, Figure 1 shows a graph game where the coalition {sat, chall} gets a worth v({sat, chall}) = 55, while the coalition {chall,
Using this representation scheme, games can be more succinct than the so called characteristic form, where all the 2 n values of the worth function should be explicitly listed. Clearly, for any such a game and any coalition S, the worth v(S) can be computed in deterministic polynomial time.
Next, we recall from [8] a rather general compact representation scheme just requiring for the worth function to be computable in FNP [14] . This will be useful to tackle with open question (c) of the Introduction.
Thus, let C be a class of TU games as defined by a certain given encoding scheme. For any TU game G, denote by v G its worth function, and by N G its set of players. Define the worth relation for the class C as the set of tuples W C = { G, S, w | G ∈ C, S ⊆ N G , and v G (S) = w}. We say that W C is non-deterministically polynomial-time computable if there is a positive integer k such that W C is k-balanced and k-decidable, as defined next. A worth relation W C is k-balanced if ||w|| ≤ || G, S || k , where || · || denotes the number of cells occupied on the tape, while it is said k-decidable if there is a non-deterministic Turing machine that decides W C in at most || G, S, w || k time. It then follows that there is a non-deterministic Turing transducer M that may compute in O(|| G, S || k ) time the worth v(S) of any coalition S of players of G 2 .
Definition 4. Let C(R) be the class of all games encoded according to some compact representation R. We say that R is a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation if the worth relation for C(R) is non-deterministically polynomial-time computable.
In answering open questions ((a)-(c)) mentioned above, all membership proofs will be given in the general setting of non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representations, while the hardness proofs will be given for the simple setting of graph games.
The Complexity of the Bargaining Set
In this section, we deal with the bargaining set of games represented in compact form.
Definition 5. Let G be a TU game, and x be an imputation. (y, S) is an objection of player i against player j to x, if S ∈ I i,j , and y is an S-feasible payoff vector such that y k > x k for all k ∈ S. We say that this objection is through S.
(z, T ) is a counterobjection to the objection (y, S) of i against j, if T ∈ I j,i , and z is a T -feasible payoff vector such that z k ≥ x k for all k ∈ T \ S and z k ≥ y k for all k ∈ T ∩ S. We say that this counterobjection is through T .
Finally, an objection (y, S) of a player i against a player j to x is called justified if there is no counterobjection to (y, S) by j.
Definition 6. Let G be a TU game. The bargaining set BS G of G is the set of all imputations x such that there is no justified objection to x of any player i against any other player j. 
Membership
In order to prove our general membership result, we first provide a useful characterization of a player i having a justified objection against player j. The result is in the spirit of one of Maschler's [10] and connects the existence of a justified objection of i against j to some algebraic conditions to hold on coalitions that i and j (may) form. Lemma 1. Let G be a TU game, and x be an imputation. Player i has a justified objection against player j to x through coalition S if and only if the following two conditions are met:
1. for all coalitions T ∈ I j,i , if T ∩ S = ∅ then e(T, x) < 0;
the following system of linear inequalities has a solution (where t is the vector of variables
(t k ) k∈S\{i} of the system):
Proof. The proof is just sketched here-see Appendix A for a detailed one. The two conditions are meant to exclude counterobjections proposed by j. For a potential counterobjection by j, two cases are to be considered: (i) the counterobjection coalition (say, T ) has an empty intersection with the objection coalition (that is, S); (ii) this intersection is not empty. In the former case, in order for j to properly counterobject, it is sufficient for her to provide all players in T with as much payoff as that they get in the imputation x. Therefore, by requiring e(T, x) < 0 (condition 1 ), this possibility is avoided. In the latter case, condition 2 comes into play. In particular, if the system of inequalities in condition 2 has a solution, then player i, objecting with an objection (y, S), can distribute the worth to players in S so that, for any possible counterobjection (z, T ) by j, it is assured that players in S ∩ T will not receive in z as much as they get in y. Thus, while variable t k measures player k's payoff increase in y w.r.t. her payoff in x, inequalities in condition 2 force these variables t k to range so that a justified objection can be built. To illustrate, inequalities (3) imposes for i to recognize a strictly positive increase to each player in S \ {i}. Inequality (1) tells that i itself is entitled to receive a strictly positive payoff increase. Then, inequalities (2) assure that, for any possible proper subset C of S, increments assigned to players in C sum up to an overall value which is strictly larger than the total worth that j could ever provide them with using any coalition T such that S ∩ T = C (this avoids for j to counterobject using any such T even if distributing to the players in C the total excess e(T, x) available to her).
Proposition 1 (Helly's Theorem [5, 16] ). Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } be a finite family of convex sets in R n , where m > n. If
Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. Moreover, let G be any TU game in C(R), x an imputation, i and j two players of G, and S ∈ I i,j a coalition. Deciding whether player i has a justified objection against player j to x through S is in co-NP.
Proof. If player i has not a justified objection against player j to x through coalition S, then the two conditions in Lemma 1 cannot be fulfilled together. We show that this can be checked in NP. Indeed, a polynomial-time non-deterministic Turing machine M may guess the condition that is not satisfied and a certificate that in fact it is not fulfilled as follows: if the first condition cannot be met, M guesses-as a certificate-a coalition T ∈ I j,i , and checks in polynomial-time that T ∩ S = ∅ and e(T, x) > 0. Note that in order to evaluate e(T, x), M needs to compute v(T ).Since the worth function is in FNP, M has to guess the value w = v(T ) and a certificate C w , in order to check (in polynomial time) that the guessed value is indeed correct (i.e., that G, T, w belongs to the worth relation W C(R) ).
Otherwise, i.e., if the system has no solutions, M guesses |S| inequalities from (1), (2) , and (3), and checks in polynomial-time that the linear system containing these guessed inequalities has no solution. To see that the last step above is correct, observe that the full system in Lemma 1 is the intersection of an exponential number of convex sets (determined by the linear equalities), but has |S| − 1 variables only. Then, by Proposition 1, there is a certificate of infeasibility of this system consisting of (at most) |S| of its convex sets, that is, |S| of its inequalities. For the sake of completeness, we note that in order to guess an inequality of type (2) , M has to guess in fact a coalition T ∈ I j,i with a non empty intersection with S (which is clearly checkable in polynomial time, as well). Moreover, racall that in order to get the right hand side of inequalities of type (1) and (2) , M has to compute the excess of a coalition, say S ′ (which is either S or T in the system) at x, and hence the worth v(S ′ ) of that coalition. And then, M has to guess the value w = v(S ′ ) and a certificate C w , in order to check (in polynomial time) that G, S ′ , w belongs to the worth relation W C(R) . Theorem 1. Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. Given any TU game G ∈ C(R) and an imputation x, deciding whether x belongs to BS G is in Π P 2 .
Proof. We show that deciding whether x does not belong to BS G is in Σ P 2 . Imputation x does not belong to BS G if and only if there is a justified objection of a player i against a player j to x through a coalition S. Thus, a non-deterministic polynomial-time machine with an oracle in NP may guess the triple i, j, S and then, after Lemma 2, asks its oracle to check whether i has a justified objection against j to x through S or not.
Hardness
We next show that, already in the simple framework of graph games, the imputation checking problem for bargaining sets is Π P 2 -hard, hereby proving Deng and Papadimitriou's conjecture (a). Our reduction is from quantified Boolean sentences. In particular, we consider here sentences in QBF 2,∀ in the form (∀α)(∃β)φ(α, β), such that φ(α, β) is a 3CNF Boolean formula, and every universal variable α k occurs only in the pair of clauses (α k ∨¬β k )∧(¬α k ∨β k ), for 1 ≤ k ≤ n α , where n α is the number of universal variables. It is known that deciding the validity of such formulae, called hereafter NQBF 2,∀ , is Π P 2 -complete [17] . (intuitively, each variable α k enforces the truth value of its corresponding variable β k , which thus plays its role in the formula φ). We next define a graph game associated with such a NQBF 2,∀ formula. Definition 7. Let Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α, β) be an NQBF 2,∀ formula, with n α universal variables and m clauses (note that in this formulae m ≥ 2n α , since φ(α, β) contains at least a pair of clauses for each universal variable). Then, Γ 1 (Φ) = (N, E, W ) is the edge-weighted graph obtained from Φ in the following way:
• The set of vertices N contains a vertex c j , called clause player, for each clause ( 
, and two special vertices "chall" and "sat", called the challenger and the satisfier, respectively. No further vertices belong to N .
• To define edges and their associated weights, we consider the vertex labeling λ : L → LIT , where L ⊂ N is the set of literal players and LIT is the set of literals occurring in φ(α, β), that maps every literal player to a literal occurring in the formula. Moreover, let us call universal (resp., existential) players all literal players ℓ i,j such that λ(ℓ i,j ) is a literal over a universal (resp., existential) variable in α (resp., β). Also, we say that two players p 1 and p 2 are opposite if they are literals players, whose labels are opposite literals of the formula, that is, λ(p 1 ) = ¬λ(p 2 ).
• The set of edges E and its weight function W are defined as follows:
-each clause player c j is connected to each literal player ℓ i,j occurring in that clause, with a weight W ({c j , ℓ i,j }) = 1;
-every pair of opposite players p 1 and p 2 are connected by a penalty edge with a big negative weight, defined below; that is,
-all pairs of literal players ℓ i,j , ℓ i ′ ,j connected to the same clause player c j are connected to one another, and
-The challenger is connected to each universal player ℓ i,j with an edge having weight W ({chall, ℓ i,j }) = 1; and to each existential player or clause player p with an edge W ({chall, p}) = −B;
-The satisfier and the challenger are connected with an edge {sat, chall}, called the big edge, whose weight is such that the sum of the weights of all edges equals n α − 1 + m;
-B > m is any number such that W ({sat, chall}) ≥ 2m. Theorem 2. Let G be a TU graph game, and x be an imputation for G. Deciding whether x belongs to BS G is Π P 2 -hard.
Proof. We proceed by reduction from the NQBF 2,∀ validity problem. Let Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α, β) be one such a formula, having m clauses and n α universal variables. Consider its associated game Γ 1 (Φ) and the imputation x that assigns m to sat, n α − 1 to chall, and 0 to all other players. Observe that Γ 1 (Φ) and x can be obtained in polynomial time from Φ. We shall prove that Φ is valid if and only if x ∈ BS Γ 1 (Φ) . Note that x is feasible, because the worth of the grand coalition is the sum of the weights of all edges, which is n α − 1 + m, by construction (recall the definition of W ({sat, chall})). Claim 1. No player has a justified objection against chall. Proof of Claim 1. Suppose that a player p objects against chall to x through a coalition S. For such an objection to be justified, v(S) > 0 is required. Then, S does not include pairs of opposite players, to avoid penalty edges. It then follows that, for no universal variable α k , both players q and q ′ are in S, where λ(q) = α k and λ(q ′ ) = ¬α k . Let T , with |T | = n α , T ∩ S = ∅, be a set of universal players, one for each universal variable. Then, chall can counterobject through T ∪ {chall}, whose worth is precisely n α .
Claim 2. Every clause, existential and universal player can counterobject to everyone.
Proof of Claim 2. Let p be one such a player. Since she receives 0 in x, she can counterobject through the singleton coalition {p}, as v({p}) = 0. Claim 3. No player different from chall has a justified objection against sat. Proof of Claim 3. Suppose that a player p different from chall has an objection (y, S) against sat to x. It follows that sat / ∈ S and thus S cannot exploit the big edge. Then, the maximum worth of such a coalition is m. Therefore, sat can counterobject with (z, {sat, chall}), where z is a feasible distribution that assigns m to sat and the rest to chall, that is, v({sat, chall}) − m ≥ m, because v({sat, chall}) = W ({sat, chall}) and, by construction, W ({sat, chall}) ≥ 2m. Then, sat gets the same value as in x. As far as chall is concerned, the worst case to consider is when chall ∈ S, because y may assign to chall its full worth m, which is higher than what chall gets in x. However, because of the choice of z this is not sufficient to justify the objection, since z assigns to chall at least m.
By the previous claims, we can limit ourselves to analyze only objections of chall against sat. Consider any objection (y, S) of player chall against sat to x. Again, for it to have a chance of being justified, S must contain exactly one universal player per universal variable, because chall receives n α − 1 in x and she needs a strictly preferable payoff in order to object. No further player belongs to S, because chall is connected by penalty edges to all clause and existential players. Then, the payoff vector y may assign a worth strictly greater than 0 to all universal players in S, and a worth strictly greater than n α − 1 to chall.
Player sat may try to counterobject to such an objection by choosing some (z, T ), where the worth of the coalition T is at least m, so that z may assign to her at least the payoff m that she gets in x. Note that she is able to get as much only if she is able to include in T at least one literal player per clause, and using no penalty edges. This means that no pair of opposite literals belongs to T , and entails that, in fact, T should contain exactly one literal player per clause and all clause players. Observe that such a T would encode a satisfying truth-value assignment σ T for φ(α, β). More precisely, for each literal player p ∈ T , if λ(p) is a positive literal X, let σ T (X) = true; otherwise, i.e., if λ(p) = ¬X, let σ T (X) = f alse. For all variables X of φ(α, β) having no corresponding player in T , σ T (X) is arbitrary, say true. Also, note that v(T ) = m and the only useful payoff vector z assigns m to sat and 0 to all other players in T . It follows that sat cannot include in T any player p belonging to S, because the objection y assigns to p a strictly positive value. As a consequence, the truth-value assignments for the literals occurring in the first 2n α clauses is completely determined by the choice of the coalition S of chall's objection. In particular, in order to satisfy those clauses, sat has to choose what is not included in S; therefore, we may define a truth-value assignment σ S for the universal variables as follows. For each variable α k , let p k be the corresponding universal player in S (recall that S contains precisely one universal player per clause). Then, let σ S (α k ) = true if λ(p k ) = ¬α k , and σ S (α k ) = f alse if λ(p k ) = α k .
We are now ready to show Φ is valid if and only if x is in BS Γ 1 (Φ) .
⇒ Suppose that Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α, β) is valid, and let (y, S) be any objection of chall against sat to x. We show that this objection is not justified, because sat has a counterobjection (z, T ). Indeed, as described above, S includes exactly one universal player per universal variable, and determines a truth-value assignment σ S to these variables. Correspondingly, since Φ is valid, sat may form a coalition T encoding a satisfying assignment to φ(α, β) that includes all clause players and exactly one literal player per clause, such that S ∩T = ∅, which means that sat's choice "agrees" with the assignment σ S enforced by chall. Then, v(T ) = m and the feasible profile z that assigns m to sat and 0 to the other players entails that (z, T ) is a valid counterobjection. It can be concluded that the imputation x is in BS Γ 1 (Φ) .
⇐ Suppose that ¬Φ = (∃α)(∀β)¬φ(α, β) holds true, and let σ α be a truth-value assignment to the α variables that proves ¬Φ validity. Consider an objection (y, S) of player chall against player sat to x such that σ S = σ α . This objection is a justified one. Indeed, after this assignment and the validity of ¬Φ, there is no way for sat to form a coalition T encoding a satisfying assignment for φ(α, β)[α/σ α ]. That is, every possible coalitions of hers involves either pairs of players connected by penalty edges, or literal players belonging to S. For the latter kind of players, no feasible profile z (assigning m to sat) is able to assign a value greater than 0, as y does. Therefore, the imputation x does not belong to BS Γ 1 (Φ) .
It has been suggested that computing the bargaining set of a TU game should presumably turn out to be intrinsically more complex than computing the core [11] . The results presented here, together with those reported in [8] , seem to provide some fresh evidence that this is the case.
The Complexity of the Kernel
Next, we consider the kernel of coalitional games, by defining the needed notions of objections and counterobjections [13] .
Definition 8. Let G be a TU game, and x be an imputation. S is an objection of player i against player j to x, if S ∈ I i,j , and x j > v({j}). We say that this objection is through S.
A coalition T is a counterobjection to the objection S of i against j, if T ∈ I j,i , and e(T, x) ≥ e(S, x). We say that this counterobjection is through T .
Finally, an objection S of a player i against player j to x is called justified if there is no counterobjection to S by j. Definition 9. Let G be a TU game. The kernel K G of G is the set of imputations x such that, there is no justified objection to x of any player i against any other player j.
Example 2. Consider again the coalitional game defined in Example 1 It is easily verified that the imputation x ′ = (4, 14, 24) is in the kernel of G as well. To see this, let us limit ourselves to consider just the objections that player 1 may raise (as for the other players, a similar reasoning would apply).
Player 1 may object either against player 2 or against player 3. In the first case, player 1 may form two coalitions S, that are {1} and {1, 3}. If S = {1} then player 2 can counterobject through T = {2, 3} since e(T, x) = 2 ≥ −4 = e(S, x). If S = {1, 3}, then player 2 can counterobject through T = {2, 3} since e(T, x) = 2 ≥ 2 = e(S, x). In the second case (player 1 against player 3), player 1 can object through S = {1} or S = {1, 2}. If S = {1} then player 3 can counterobject through T = {2, 3} since e(T, x) = 2 ≥ −4 = e(S, x). Finally, if S = {1, 2}, then player 3 can counterobject through T = {2, 3} since e(T, x) = 2 ≥ 2 = e(S, x).
Lemma 3. Let G be a TU game, and x be an imputation. A player i has a justified objection against player j to x iff x j > v({j}) and max S∈I i,j e(S, x) > max T ∈I j,i e(T, x) hold.
Proof.
⇐ Suppose that player i has not a justified objection against player j to x. This means that either x ≤ v({j}) or player j has a counterobjection against every objection of i. If x j ≤ v({j}) then this direction of the proof trivially follows.
Suppose that x j > v({j}); then player i can object against j, but j can always counterobject to i. Therefore, for all coalitions S ∈ I i,j there is a coalition T ∈ I j,i such that e(T, x) ≥ e(S, x). Let S = arg max S∈I i,j e(S, x). By the previous discussion there is a coalition T such that e(T , x) ≥ e( S, x). Thus, max T ∈I j,i e(T, x) ≥ e(T , x) ≥ max S∈I i,j e(S, x).
⇒ Suppose that player i has a justified objection against player j to x. This means that x j > v({j}) and there is a coalition S ∈ I i,j such that e(S, x) > e(T, x) for all coalitions T ∈ I j,i . By this, e(S, x) > max T ∈I j,i e(T, x). Thus, max S∈I i,j e(S, x) ≥ e(S, x) > max T ∈I j,i e(T, x).
Membership
Theorem 3. Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. Given any TU game G ∈ C(R) and an imputation x, deciding whether x belongs to K G is in ∆ P 2 . Proof. By definition of W C (R), there exists a fixed integer k such that, for every game G in C(R), the worth of every coalition S of G is k-balanced, that is ||v(S)|| ≤ || G, S || k .
Let G ∈ C(R) be a TU game, x an imputation, and p and q two players. By Lemma 3, to verify that p has not a justified objection against q one can check that either x q = v({q}), 3 or max S∈Ip,q e(S, x) ≤ max T ∈Iq,p e(T, x). This can be done in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine M with an NP oracle, as follows:
1. Check whether x q = v({q}). Since G ∈ C(R), then M can ask its NP oracle, using just one call, to check whether x q = v({q}). If the equality is satisfied, then p has not a justified objection against q, otherwise the following check must be performed.
2. Since G ∈ C(R), then the worth of every coalition in G cannot exceed the largest (positive or negative) value representable in || G, S || k cells of the tape of M . Hence, M can evaluate max S∈Ip,q e(S, x) and max T ∈Iq,p e(T, x) by a binary search with polynomially many calls to its NP oracle. Then, M can compare max S∈Ip,q e(S, x) and max T ∈Iq,p e(T, x) and decide whether p has a justified objection against q.
To know whether x is in K G , M must check that no player has a justified objection against anyone else, so the above procedure must be repeated for all pairs of distinct players. Thus, the overall computation is feasible in ∆ P 2 .
Hardness
Definition 10. Let φ be a boolean formula in 3CNF, and α 1 , . . . , α n be an ordering on variables of φ. Define Γ 2 (φ) the graph game obtained from φ as follows:
• The set of vertices of the graph includes a vertex α i for each variable α i of φ, called variable player ; a vertex c i for each clause c i of φ, called clause player ; for each literal ℓ i,j occurring in a clause c j , a vertex ℓ i,j denoting a literal player ; two special vertices "chall" and "sat", called the challenger and the satisfier, respectively.
• To define edges and their associated weights, we consider the same vertex labeling λ : L → LIT , we used in Definition 7. Moreover, we say that two players p 1 and p 2 are opposite if they are literal players, whose labels are opposite literals of the formula, that is, λ(p 1 ) = ¬λ(p 2 ).
We say that a variable player p 1 and a literal player p 2 are opposite if the variable α i of φ associated to p 1 is negated in λ(p 2 ), that is α i = ¬λ(p 2 ).
• The set of edges of Γ 2 (φ) and its weight function W (·) are defined as follows:
-each clause player c j is connected to every literal player ℓ i,j occurring in that clause, with a weight W ({c j , ℓ i,j }) = C;
-every pair of opposite players are connected by an edge with a big negative value −B;
-all pairs of literal players ℓ i,j , ℓ i ′ ,j , included in the same clause c j (and, thus, connected to the same clause player c j ) are connected to one another, and
-the challenger is linked to each variable player α i by an edge with weight W ({chall,
-the satisfier is linked to each variable player α i by an edge with weight W ({sat, α i }) = 2 i (2 ≤ i ≤ n), and is connected to α 1 by an edge of weight W ({sat, α 1 }) = 2 1 + 2 0 ;
-The satisfier and the challenger are connected by an edge {sat, chall}, called the big edge, whose weight is such that the sum of the weights of all edges equals 1 (so that v(N ) = 1);
where C = 2 k and B = 2 s are such that: (i) k > n + 2, (ii) s is chosen so that 2 s is larger than the sum D of all positive values associated with graph edges apart from the big edge, and (iii) the implied value associated with the big edge is itself larger than D. Note that the size of the representation of all such values is anyway polynomial in the size of φ. Figure 2 shows the graph game Γ 2 (φ e ), where Theorem 4. Let G be a TU graph game, and x be an imputation for G. Deciding whether x belongs to K G is ∆ P 2 -hard.
Proof. In order to prove this result we will show a polynomial-time reduction from the problem MSA odd , that is known to be ∆ P 2 -complete, to the problem of deciding whether an imputation x belongs to the kernel of a TU game or not. An instance of MSA odd is a boolean formula φ in 3CNF and an ordering of the variables in φ, say α 1 , . . . α n , and it is asked if α 1 is true in the lexicographically maximum satisfying assignment of φ. We can assume without loss of generality that φ is satisfiable and that each of its clauses contains exactly three literals.
Let φ be an instance of MSA odd . Consider the TU graph game Γ 2 (φ), and the imputation x that assigns 0 to all players of Γ 2 (φ) except for sat that receives 1. Note that, by construction, x is an imputation. We will show that φ is a "yes" instance of MSA odd if and only if x is in K Γ 2 (φ) .
Preliminarily note that no player but chall can have a justified objection against sat. Indeed, if such a player p tries to object against sat, then sat can successfully counterobject by simply forming a coalition with chall whereby getting a big worth, which will correspond to a big excess, as determined by the big edge. Moreover, since any player p = sat of Γ 2 (φ) receives 0 in x, no player q can object against such a player p, because it is not true that x p > v({p}) = 0.
⇒ Suppose that φ is a "yes" instance of MSA odd , and hence that α 1 is true in the maximum satisfying assignment of φ. Consider any objection of chall against sat. By Lemma 3, we may focus on the coalition S that maximizes e(S, x). Since C = 2 k > n i=1 2 i and φ is satisfiable, S definitely contains all clause players and exactly one literal player per clause (to avoid penalty edges). That is, S encodes a satisfying assignment σ S for φ, where σ S (α i ) = true if and only if the variable player α i ∈ S. Indeed, by the choice of C, missing some clause player cannot be counterbalanced by any clever choice of variable players to be included in the coalition, as well as including opposite literals leading to penalties. Moreover, in order to maximize e(S, x), among these possible satisfying assignments, chall will include in S those players that let her further increase the coalition worth by adding a set of variable players with the highest weights. By construction of Γ 2 (φ), such a coalition S maximizing e(S, x) is the one encoding the maximum satisfying assignment of φ.
However, player sat can counterobject, by forming a coalition T including all players in S but chall. We have that v(T ) = v(S)+ 1 by construction (remember that W ({sat, α 1 }) = 2 1 + 2 0 ) and because α 1 is true in the maximum satisfying assignment of φ. Since x assigns 1 to sat, we have that e(S, x) . Therefore, such a T is a counterobjection by sat.
⇐ Suppose that φ is a "no" instance of MSA odd , and hence that α 1 is false in the maximum satisfying assignment of φ. Consider the objection S of chall against sat to x containing literal players to satisfy all clauses (exactly one literal player per clause), all clause players, and those variable players as to determine the maximum satisfying assignment (which exists since φ is satisfiable).
Player sat cannot counterobject against chall because the best coalition she can form contains those literal players allowing sat to satisfy all clauses (exactly one literal player per clause), all clause player, and those variable players as to encode the maximum satisfying assignment. Since α 1 is false in the maximum satisfying assignment then x) . Therefore, since e(S, x) > e(T, x), S is a justified objection of chall against sat and hence x is outside K Γ 2 (φ) .
Conclusions and further results
In this paper we settled some computational questions about the bargaining set and the kernel of TU games, thus solving a number of problems left open in [4] .
In a companion paper [9] we also have studied the problems of checking whether a consequenceis in the bargaining set of games with non-transferable utilities (NTU games) 4 , which we simply announce here: (i) given an NTU game G represented through any FNP scheme, deciding whether an imputation is in the bargaining set of G is in Π P 2 ; (ii) given an NTU game G represented through NTU MC-nets 5 , deciding whether an imputation is in the bargaining set of G is Π P 2 -hard; (iii) given an NTU game G represented through any FNP scheme, deciding whether the bargaining set of G is non-empty 6 is in Σ P 3 ; (iv) given an NTU game G represented through NTU MC-nets, deciding whether the bargaining set of G is non-empty is Σ P 3 -hard. Moreover, note that the results we have presented here carry over quite easily to the more general definition of the considered solution concepts in terms of coalitional structures [1] .
It is worthwhile noting that our hardness proofs heavily exploit the presence of negative edges in graph games. For completeness we observe that, if no negative edges occur, graph games are convex, and thus the bargaining set coincides with the core [12] , which for convex games is an easier notion [3] .
It would be interesting to identify other interesting classes of games where the bargaining set or the kernel can be computed efficiently, or at least their membership problems can be solved efficiently. A possible line of research is to look for restriction of games in terms of the structure of player interactions.
A Proof of Lemma 1 Lemma 1. Let G be a TU game, and x be an imputation. Player i has a justified objection against player j to x through coalition S if and only if the following two conditions are met:
the following system of linear inequalities has a solution (where t is the vector of variables
Proof.
⇒ Suppose that (y, S) is a justified objection of player i against player j to x. Now we will show that conditions 1 and 2 are met.
Suppose, by the way of contradiction, that condition 1 is not met; then, there is a coalition, say T , such that T ∩ S = ∅ and e( T , x) ≥ 0. If e( T , x) = 0, then player j can offer to all players in T the same payoff as in x. Such a payoff vector z, in which z k = x k for all players k ∈ T , is T -feasible since z( T ) = x( T ) and e( T , x) = v( T )−x( T ) = 0. Then (z, T ) is a counterobjection of player j against objection (y, S) of player i: a contradiction. If e( T , x) > 0 then player j can offer to all players in T a payoff strictly greater than in x. Consider, for example, the payoff vector z in which z k = x k + (v( T ) − x( T ))/| T | for all players k ∈ T . Note that z is T -feasible since z( T ) = x( T ) + e( T , x) and e( T , x) = v( T ) − x( T ). Then (z, T ) is a counterobjection of player j against objection (y, S) of player i: a contradiction. It is, therefore, concluded that condition 1 is met.
To prove that condition 2 holds as well, we will show a solution for the system of linear inequalities. Lett k = y k − x k be a vector of values for all players k ∈ S \ {i}. Since (y, S) is an objection, by Definition 5,t k > 0 for all k and hence this vector complies with inequalities (6). We know that y i − x i > 0, since (y, S) is an objection, therefore:
t(S \ {i}) <t(S \ {i}) + y i − x i = y(S) − x(S) (by definition oft k ) = v(S) − x(S) (by S-feasibility of y) = e(S, x), and hence inequality (4) is satisfied by vectort. Suppose, by contradiction, that vectort does not satisfy an inequality (5) . Then, there is a coalition T such thatt( C) ≤ e( T , x), where C = T ∩ S. By this, player j can counterobject through coalition T . Indeed, ift( C) = e( T , x), then player j can offer a payoff z k = x k to all players k ∈ T \ S, and a payoff z k = y k to all players k ∈ T ∩ S. Note that and hence z is T -feasible: a contradiction. These contradictions show that all inequalities (5) are satisfied by vectort, and thust is a solution for the system of condition 2. Summarizing, then, if player i has a justified objection against player j to x through coalition S, then the two conditions stated in the Lemma are satisfied.
⇐ Suppose there are a player i, a player j, and a coalition S such that the two conditions of the Lemma are satisfied. We will show that player i has a justified objection against player j to x through coalition S.
Lett be one of the solutions of the system in condition 2. Consider the following payoff vector y on coalition S in which y i = x i + ǫ, and y k = x k +t k for all players k ∈ S \ {i}, where ǫ = e(S, x) −t(S \ {i}). Sincet is a solution of that system, we have that y k > x k for all players k ∈ S (ǫ > 0 andt k > 0 because inequalities (4) and ( and hence y is S-feasible. As a consequence, (y, S) is an objection of player i against player j to x. Now, suppose, by contradiction, that (y, S) is not a justified objection, hence there is a counterobjection (z, T ) of player j against objection (y, S) of player i. There are two cases, either T ∩ S = ∅ or T ∩ S = ∅.
-Suppose that T ∩ S = ∅. By Definition 5, z( T ) ≥ x( T ) must hold. Therefore, we obtain:
e( T , x) ≥ 0 (by definition of excess),
